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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature of the Case
While Katie Turner was staying at a house belonging to an acquaintance who lived out of
town, two Benewah County deputies entered the house without a warrant, detained the
occupants, and searched various parts of the house.

Their initial search disclosed

methamphetamine and drug paraphernalia hidden in a toilet. Although that particular contraband
was never connected to Ms. Turner in any way, after Ms. Turner saw the other occupants
confronted with it and threatened with arrest, and after one of the officers implied that he would
be searching the rest of the house, including her bedroom, Ms. Turner disclosed some additional
contraband hidden in her room.
Ms. Turner filed a suppression motion challenging the officers' original entry into the
house, the search of the bathroom, and, finally, the search of her room; however, the district
court denied that motion. The court ruled that Ms. Turner lacked Fourth Amendment "standing"
because she exceeded the homeowner's permission by staying there overnight. Alternatively, it
ruled that the officers' actions in initially entering the house, and later searching Ms. Turner's
bedroom, were permissible under the consent exception to the warrant requirement. The district
court never addressed the propriety of the search of the toilet, or whether the officers' actions in
that regard in any way tainted Mr. Turner's consent to the search of her bedroom.
On appeal, Ms. Turner contends that each of the district court's alternative rulings were
erroneous.

In response, the State takes a shotgun approach-raising a host of alternative

arguments, many of which are either directly contrary to positions it took below or are simply
brand-new on appeal-in a bid to try to justify the district court's rulings. For the reasons
detailed herein, the State's arguments are without merit.

1

Statement of Facts and Course of Proceedings
Ms. Turner detailed the factual and procedural histories of this case in her Appellant's
Brief and, therefore, does not repeat them herein.

2

ISSUE
Did the district court err by denying Ms. Turner's suppression motion?

3

ARGUMENT
The District Court Erred By Denying Ms. Turner's Motion To Suppress

A.

Introduction
The State seeks to have this Court affirm the district court's decision denying

Ms. Turner's suppression motion with a series of arguments that are made for the first time on
appeal, run directly contrary to the State's positions below, require this Court to act as a factfinder, and/or are untethered to existing law.

This Court should reject all of the State's

arguments.

B.

Ms. Turner Had "Standing" To Challenge The Unlawful Search Of Her Bedroom
The State argues that the district court was correct to have ruled that Ms. Turner lacked

standing to challenge the search of her bedroom because, although she had the homeowner' s
permission to be present in the home, she exceeded the owner's permission by living there. The
State makes this argument, despite having conceded below that Ms. Turner was allowed to live
in the home and, in fact, had standing to challenge the search. Further, State's argument hinges
on the mistaken belief that an individual's ability to claim the protections of the Fourth
Amendment is based solely on her contract rights. The State is incorrect at each tum.

1.

Because The State Conceded Ms. Turner's Standing Below, The District Court
Erred In Even Addressing It

In her Appellant's Brief, Ms. Turner argued that the district court should not have even
addressed the question of standing, since it was conceded by the prosecutor below. (See App.
Br., pp.16, 17-21.) In response, the State only half-heartedly argues standing was not conceded
below. (See Resp. Br., p.15 n.9.) In a footnote, it claims, "it is not clear that the prosecutor did
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concede standing below." (Resp. Br., p.15 n.9.) It then goes on to suggest that maybe, when, in
response to defense counsel's assertion that standing had been established, the prosecutor told
the district court that he was "satisfied with the standing, your honor," what he really meant was
that he did not intend to present testimony on the standing question. (See Resp. Br., p.15 n.9
(quoting Tr., p.12, Ls.11-15).) Given the full context surrounding the prosecutor's statement,
this insinuation is meritless:
MR. HULL [Defense Counsel]: So, your Honor, I believe we've
established standing. It's a warrantless search. I believe the burden shifts to the
State at this time.
MR. THIE [Prosecutor]: Court [sic] is satisfied with the standing, your

Honor.
THE COURT: All right. So you're not calling any further witnesses at
this time?
MR. HULL: Not at this time, your Honor.
THE COURT: Mr. Thie?
MR. THIE: Thank you, your Honor....
(Tr., p.12, Ls.11-20 (emphasis added).) It could hardly be clearer that the prosecutor conceded
the question of standing. However, even if the prosecutor's statement had been ambiguous, his
statements later in the suppression hearing clarified that he knew Ms. Turner was legitimately
living in the home, in which case she certainly would have had standing to challenge a search of
that home. The prosecutor admitted that, "at some point, they [Deputies Wynn and Pulley] do in
fact find out that she [Ms. Turner] is allowed to live there [in Mr. Simons's house]." (Tr., p.67,
Ls.8-9.) He also conceded that Mr. Simons lacked actual authority to consent to the search of his
house because a landlord or owner cannot consent when someone else lives in the home
(although he denied that there was a true landlord/tenant relationship). (See Tr., p.64, L.17 p.66, L.14.) In light of all of this, this Court should reject the State's invitation to find that the
prosecutor did not concede standing below.

5

The State's primary argument as to why this Court ought to accept the district court's
conclusion that Ms. Turner lacked standing-despite its concession of that issue below-is that a
district court should not be reversed because of a party's "erroneous concession."

(Resp.

Br., p.15.) According to the State, holding it to the positions it took below, "amounts to the
proposition that the district court is required to adopt a legal conclusion that it believes to be
erroneous based on the representation of one of the parties." (Resp. Br., p.15.) There are at least
two significant flaws with the State's position.
First, the State is now improperly arguing a position that is diametrically opposed to the
one it took below.

Below, the State conceded that Ms. Turner had permission to live in

Mr. Simons's house, and that she had standing to challenge the search of that house. (Tr., p.12,
Ls.11-15, p.67, Ls.8-9.) Now, the State argues on appeal that she did not have permission to live
there, and so she did not have standing. (Resp. Br., pp.14-26.) This type of 180-degree change
in position has been rejected by the Idaho Supreme Court. See, e.g., State v. Wolfe, 165 Idaho
338, 342 (2019) (refusing to consider the State's proffered independent source doctrine argument
on appeal where, although the prosecutor below cited an independent source doctrine case, he
explicitly indicated he was not relying on that case in furtherance of an independent source
doctrine argument); State v. Cohagan, 162 Idaho 717, 721 (2017) (refusing to consider the
State's argument on appeal that an officer's detention of the defendant was lawful, where the
prosecutor had expressly conceded below that the seizure was unlawful).

Thus, this Court

should not even entertain the State's changed position on appeal.
Granted, the most recent cases on this topic-Wolfe and Cohagan-involved somewhat
different procedural postures. In those cases, once the prosecutor disavowed and conceded,
respectively, the legal principles at issue, the district courts correctly declined to address those
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legal principles.

Here, however, the district court actually addressed the conceded legal

principle. Because of this, the State seeks to use State v. Jeske, 164 Idaho 862 (2019), to justify
its changed position on appeal. (See Resp. Br., pp.17-18.) The Jeske Court held that, when it
comes to issue preservation, although Idaho's appellate courts will not consider issues raised for
the first time on appeal, they can consider issues "argued to, or decided by" the trial court. Id. at
868. However, Ms. Turner's position is not, and never has been, that the standing issue was not

preserved. It is that the State should be held to its concession because it is fundamentally unfair
to allow it to change positions on appeal. (See App. Br., pp.18-21.) This argument was initially
made with respect to the district court ignoring the State's concession and addressing standing,
but it applies with equal force to the State now taking a position on appeal that is directly
contrary to that which it took below.
Furthermore, under the unique facts of this case, Jeske should provide the State no license
to change positions on appeal. Here, after the prosecutor expressly conceded the standing issue
at the suppression hearing of July 20, 2018, the district court not only addressed standing in its
August 3, 2018 order, but it did so based on the wholly mistaken belief that the State had

affirmatively argued that Ms. Turner lacked standing.

(R., p.67 ("The State alleges that a

warrant was not needed because Turner lacks standing to raise the issue . . . .").)

This is

obviously incorrect. 1 To the extent that the district court misremembered and, thus, dramatically
mischaracterized the State's arguments, that error in the State's favor ought not to inure in the
State's benefit and justify the additional error of allowing the State to change its position on
appeal. As the old adage goes, two wrongs do not make a right.

1

The State filed no written response to Ms. Turner's suppression motion (see generally R.) and,
as noted, at the suppression hearing, the prosecutor actually conceded Ms. Turner was staying in
the home and had standing (see Tr., p.12, Ls.11-15, p.67, Ls.8-9).
7

Second, the State's overarching justification for changing its position on appeal has
already been explicitly rejected by the Idaho Supreme Court. The State emphasizes that because
standing is a question of law, the State's concession of the standing question below was
irrelevant, as the district court (and presumably this Court) is required to apply the law correctly.
(See Resp. Br., pp.15-16.) However, the Supreme Court rejected a strikingly similar argument in
Cohagan. In that case, the Court expressly noted that the fact that a certain question is one of

law does not require the reviewing court to consider it:
[T]he State maintains on appeal, even though it conceded the point below, that the
Court must decide whether the interaction between Cohagan and Officer Curtis
was lawful. This is incorrect. It is true that the question of whether a seizure
occurred is a question of law over which we exercise free review. . . . [But, t]o
allow the State to change positions on appeal and argue that the stop was not
illegal would sharply cut against our longstanding and recently re-affirmed policy
ofrequiring parties to present their arguments to the court below.
Cohagan, 162 Idaho at 721.

Moreover, the State's argument represents a misunderstanding of what it means to
concede the issue of standing.

The State suggests that, had the district court accepted its

concession (which the State suddenly now claims was erroneous (Resp. Br., pp.11, 15, 17, 18)),
it would have necessarily "adopt[ed]" the "legal conclusion" that Ms. Turner had standing.
(Resp. Br., p.15.) That is untrue. In this context, the State's concession of the standing issue
simply withdrew it from the court's consideration; it was a waiver of the issue. See State v.
Cardenas, 143 Idaho 903, 908 (Ct. App. 2006) (holding the State implicitly ''waived the issue of

standing" by taking a position in the district court that was inconsistent with its argument that the
defendant lacked standing); State v. Hanson, 142 Idaho 711, 719 (Ct. App. 2006) ("Defendants .
. . must show in every case that they have standing to challenge the search, or convince the State
to so stipulate.") (emphasis added); see also Kentucky v. King, 563 U.S. 452, 457 n.1 (2011)
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(assuming without deciding that the defendant had standing because Kentucky had conceded
standing in state court).
This is not a novel concept. Courts routinely avoid addressing legal issues they need not
reach. Their doing so, clearly, is not a comment or decision on the merits. In Cohagan, for
example, when the Idaho Supreme Court held the State to its concession that the defendant had
been unlawfully detained, it certainly did not hold that there was an unlawful detention under the
facts of that case; it simply assumed so, without deciding the question. Cohagan, 162 Idaho at
721.

Likewise, in Wolfe, when the Supreme Court held the State to its disavowal of any

independent source doctrine argument, the Court did not hold that the independent source
doctrine standards were not satisfied; it simply did not address the issue. See Wolfe, 165 Idaho at
341-43. In fact, in that case, the Court recognized that, had the independent source doctrine
argument been properly before the Court, it may very well have carried the day. Id. at 342 n.4.
But, as the Court noted, it is not a court's job "to save a party from its tactical errors below." Id.

2.

Because Ms. Turner Was Living At Mr. Simons's House, She Had A Legitimate
Expectation Of Privacy In The House

Even if the district court properly addressed the standing question (and regardless of the
propriety of the State's new arguments on appeal), Ms. Turner argues alternatively that the
evidence shows that she did have standing, so the district court erred in concluding otherwise.
(See App. Br., pp.21-27.) In response, the State contends the district court correctly ruled that

Ms. Turner lacked standing. (See Resp. Br., pp.19-26.)
The State's argument centers around the idea that, because the district court found
Ms. Turner's permission to be in Mr. Simons's house was limited to checking on it, and that she
exceeded that limited license by living there, it is not possible for her to have had a reasonable
expectation of privacy in the home. (Resp. Br., pp.19-26.) Under the State's reasoning, the
9

reasonableness of an individual's expectation of privacy in a thing hinges solely on the degree to
which the individual complies with the license granted by the owner, or some third party. (See
Resp. Br., pp.24-26 (recognizing that a reasonable expectation of privacy may exist even in the
absence of a license granted by the owner, but only if some third party granted a license).) The
State's extreme position is untenable.
As was noted in Ms. Turner's opening brief (see App. Br., p.25), The United States
Supreme Court long ago rejected the notion that standing turns on "arcane distinctions developed
in property and tort law between guests, licensees, invitees, and the like .... " Rakas v. Illinois,
439 U.S. 128, 143 (1978). Thus, the Court has expressly rejected the notion that "permission" is
the linchpin of standing. Id. at 148. Indeed, there is no "single metric or exhaustive list of
considerations to resolve the circumstances in which a person can be said to have a reasonable
expectation of privacy .... " Byrd v. United States,_ U.S._, 138 S. Ct. 1518, 1527 (2018).
Accordingly, the Court should reject the State's overly simplistic, black-and-white standing
argument.
Further, to the extent that the State attempts to downplay the considerations that ought to
inform the Court's analysis of whether Ms. Turner had standing in this case, its arguments are
unconvincing. First, the State tries to quibble over whether Ms. Turner was legitimately on the
premises (again, based on the argument that she exceeded Mr. Simons's license). (See Resp.
Br., pp.20-21 & n.11.) However, the record clearly indicates she had a right to be present, as
Mr. Simons specifically told the officers she could stay. (See, e.g., Video 2 at 4: 15 - 4:26 ("So
Katie and Darren have permission to be in the house .... ").)
Second, the State argues that the fact that Ms. Turner was staying overnight in the home
is of no consequence because, without having been invited to spend the night, "the 'longstanding

social custom' of being and having overnight guests, which tradition 'serves functions
recognized as valuable by society,"' is not served. (Resp. Br., p.21 (quoting Minnesota v. Olson,
495 U.S. 91, 98 (1990).) It goes on to claim that, the United States Supreme Court has "focused
on the fact that '[t ]he houseguest is there with the permission of his host, who is willing to share
his house and his privacy with his guest,"' and the State argues, "[a]s a result of the host's
permission, and the longstanding social custom associated with being and having houseguests,
overnight guests can reasonably expect privacy." (Resp. Br., p.21 (quoting Olson, 495 U.S. at
99).) However, this is misleading. While the Olson Court certainly discussed the tradition of,
and social value inherent in, having houseguests, see Olson, 495 U.S. at 98, the "houseguest"
rationale was not the only reason the Court recognized that someone staying overnight may have
a reasonable expectation of privacy in a place. The Court also noted that people seek out places
of shelter in which to spend the night because "[ w ]e are at our most vulnerable when we are
asleep because we cannot monitor our own safety or the security of our belongings." Id. at 99.
Certainly, this concern would apply equally to a young woman exceeding her license to check on
a house by staying overnight, as it would to an invited houseguest.
Third, the State argues that Ms. Turner's vulnerability while sleeping is relevant only to
her subjective expectation of privacy, not the reasonableness of that expectation.

(Resp.

Br., p.22.) It is unclear where the State came up with such a notion, as it cites no authority for it
(see Resp. Br., p.22); however, it is clear that it is wrong as a matter of law. As noted, the Olson

Court specifically considered the fact that, as human beings, we are inherently vulnerable when
we sleep, in considering whether the defendant's expectation of privacy in that case was "rooted
in 'understandings that are recognized and permitted by society,' [and] was legitimate .... "
Olson, 495 U.S. at 100 (quoting Rakas, 439 U.S. at 144 n.12).
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Fourth, the State likewise argues (again, without citation to authority) that Ms. Turner's
control over the property is relevant only to her subjective expectation of privacy, not the
reasonableness of that expectation. (Resp. Br., p.22.) Again, the State's argument is incorrect as
a matter of law. The Supreme Court has repeatedly recognized that an individual's authority
over premises, and ability to exclude others, is one of the considerations relevant to determining
whether that individual's expectation of privacy in a place is reasonable. See, e.g., Byrd, 138 S.
Ct. at 1528-29, 1531 (observing that even an unauthorized driver of a rental car has a right to
exclude others, and considering this as a factor in holding that the unauthorized driver had a
reasonable expectation of privacy in the car); Rakas, 439 U.S. at 149 ("Except with respect to his
friend, Jones had complete dominion and control over the apartment and could exclude others
from it. ... Jones could legitimately expect privacy .... "). And, in this case, Ms. Turner clearly
had authority over Mr. Simons's house while he was away. She had a key, and she was one of
the people entrusted to check on the house. (Video 1 at 18:16 - 18:51 (key); Video 2 at 4:15 4:26 (permission).) Certainly, she had the authority to exclude others.
In light of all of the foregoing, this Court should reject the State's theory that exceeding a
homeowner's license in staying overnight at a residence ipso facto deprives a person of standing
to contest a search of that residence. Instead, to the extent that this Court even reaches the
standing question, it should evaluate the totality of the circumstances, and hold that Ms. Turner's
expectation of privacy in the residence in which she had been staying was reasonable.

C.

The Officers' Searches Of Both The Bathroom And Ms. Turner's Bedroom Were
Impermissible Under The Fourth Amendment
Ms. Turner contends that the officers' search of the bathroom in the home in which was

staying was illegal, and that that illegal search tainted any consent she gave to search her
bedroom. (See App. Br., pp.28-39.) In response, the State offers a host of arguments-most
12

made for the first time on appeal-for why it thinks the officer's search of the bathroom and
Ms. Turner's bedroom were proper.

(Resp. Br., pp.26-38.)

The Court should reject those

arguments.

1.

The W arrantless Search Of The Bathroom Was Improper

In her opening brief, Ms. Turner pointed out that she had argued below that the officers'
warrantless search of the bathroom was illegal, but the State failed to proffer, much less prove,
an applicable exception to the warrant requirement, and, therefore, the district court erred in
failing to suppress the fruits of that search. (App. Br., pp.29-30.) In response, the State argues
for the first time on appeal that the search of the bathroom was permissible under the consent
exception to the warrant requirement because, when Mr. Simons asked officers to check on his
house, he implicitly granted them consent to thoroughly search everything in that house,
including the toilet bowl. (Resp. Br., pp.27-29.) It then asks this Court to make a factual finding
of consent, which was never made by the district court, and affirm on that basis.

(Resp.

Br., p.29.) The State's arguments have no merit.
First, the State's argument is a brand-new one, made for the first time on appeal, so it
should not even be entertained by this Court. See, e.g., State v. Hoskins, 165 Idaho 217, 221
(2019) (holding that the State may not seek to justify a warrantless search or seizure based on an
exception to the warrant requirement that was not argued below). Below, the prosecutor never
even addressed the legality of the officers' warrantless search of the toilet, much less specifically
argued that Mr. Simons consented to the toilet's search.

(See Tr., p.64, L.8 - p.69, L.4.)

However, on appeal, the State seeks to make it appear that the prosecutor did, in fact, proffer a
"consent" argument with regard to the search of the toilet. The State identifies a single reference
in the prosecutor's closing argument at the suppression hearing concerning Mr. Simons's consent
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to "search," as opposed to merely enter, the house, and it uses this single reference to attempt to
argue the prosecutor preserved a "consent" exception argument with regard to the toilet. (See
Resp. Br., p.28 (quoting Tr., p.65, Ls.12-14)). 2 However, this one reference to consent to search
the house was not necessarily directed at the search of the bathroom or the toilet. (See Tr., p.65,
Ls.12-14; see also Tr., p.64, Ls.11-16.) In fact, in context, the prosecutor appears to have been
arguing that Mr. Simons's consent justified the officers' initial entry into the home.

(See

Tr., p.64, L.8 - p.67, L.7.) Ms. Turner submits that in a case involving a warrantless entry into a
home, and two separate warrantless searches inside the home, one or two vague, passing
references to consent to search the home generally are insufficient to put at issue the "consent"
exception as applied to any particular search. Cf State v. Wolfe, 165 Idaho 338, 342 (2019)
("Allowing the State to merely cite a case without arguing the proper legal theory applicable to
the issue at hand would effectively nullify the State's burden to prove application of an identified
exception to the warrant requirement. Such a 'kitchen sink' strategy will not suffice to preserve
an issue for appeal and is inherently unfair to the defense.").
Second, because the State's "consent" argument was never made below, and never passed
upon by the district court, the district court never made the requisite factual finding of consent.
See Schneckloth v. Bustamante, 412 U.S. 218, 248 (1973).

This is particularly problematic

where, as here, the State's argument is based on a mere implication of consent, as opposed to
express consent. The State argues that this Court should make a finding of consent to search the
entire home, including the toilet bowl, based on Mr. Simons's statement that he did not want
people dealing drugs out of his house. (Resp. Br., pp.28-29 (citing Ex. A).) In his Facebook
Messenger conversation with Detective Richardson, Mr. Simons asked Detective Richardson to
2

The prosecutor had also made an earlier reference to Mr. Simons's consent to search. (See
Tr., p.64, Ls.11-16.)
14

check on his house because, "I just heard some not good things about my trailer. [Rumors] are
bad there. I'm not sure if it's true but lots of traffic and maybe some [illegal] shit too[.] So you
think there is anything to it? If there is, get them! [O]r let me know and I'll kick everyone [sic]
of them off my place." (Ex. A, p.1.) Later, Mr. Simons indicated that his "dad would freak out
if there was any drug dealing or any other illegal shit happening there. So if they are doing stuff
like that there, get them for me." (Ex. A, p.2.) He also made it clear that, although Tiffany
Reeves was allowed to be on the property, she was not authorized to plug her camper into his
electrical outlet or other utilities.

(Ex. A, pp.2-3.)

Thus, while Mr. Simons was clearly

concerned about unauthorized individuals using his house for drug dealing, or running up his
utility bills, at no point did he expressly authorize the police to rummage through the interior of
his house. (See generally Ex. A.) Indeed, even when Detective Richardson told Mr. Simons that
he, "told the Deputies they have your full permission to check inside your trailer and the
property" (Ex., A., p.4), it appears his understanding was that officers were permitted to look
inside for unauthorized individuals, not thoroughly search for contraband or evidence. 3 Thus, in

3

The State also argues that Detective Richardson "discussed logging any 'dope' that they find,"
in furtherance of its argument that Mr. Simons impliedly consented to a full search of his home.
(Resp. Br., p.28 (quoting Ex. A, p.5).) However, this argument is misleading. It is not at all
clear that Detective Richardson was referring to "dope," when he referred to the officers logging
something. Since the preceding messages are not included in the State's exhibit, the meaning of
Detective Richardson's statement is unclear. For example, the beginning of the message
immediately preceding the one quoted by the State, also from Detective Richardson, is clearly
cut off; the only portion visible states, "and be on the property so they can have it logged." (Ex.
A, p.5.) It is not clear what the "it" that was to be logged was; however, in the context of this
partial message, "it" does not appear to mean "drugs." Likewise, the message actually quoted by
the State is ambiguous. That one states: "Just in case they find or bust people for dope it will be
logged." (Ex. A, p.5.) Again, it is not clear what "it" means-the drugs themselves or the fact
that someone was arrested and drugs were found. Further, even if Detective Richardson was
referring to logging drugs found, he could have been referring to drugs observed in plain view, or
on the person of anyone arrested. Detective Richardson's comment in no way suggests he
believed Mr. Simons provided consent to thoroughly search his house, much less that
Mr. Simons actually gave such consent.
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accepting the State's argument, this Court would either have to make a factual finding as to
consent, which would be improper, or it would have to remand the case to the district court for
additional findings. See State v. Zavala, 134 Idaho 532, 535-36 (Ct. App. 2000) (holding that
where the district court had made no factual finding regarding whether voluntary consent was
given, the Court of Appeals could not make that finding, and the case had to be remanded to the
district court). It cannot properly affirm the district court on the new grounds argued by the
State.
Third, even if this Court were inclined to address the State's new "consent" argument and
wade into a thorny factual question regarding the scope of Mr. Simons' consent, the State's
argument still fails as a matter oflaw. For Fourth Amendment purposes, valid consent to search
can come from someone who has actual authority to give such consent, or someone who has the
apparent authority to give it. See Illinois v. Rodriguez, 497 U.S. 177, 186 (1990). In this case,

Mr. Simons had neither by the time the officers searched the toilet.
While an owner will often have actual authority to consent to searches of his property,
that is not necessarily so where he has turned that property over for use by another in his
absence. See, e.g., Stoner v. California, 376 U.S. 483, 490 (1964) (holding that a hotel employee
may not consent to a search of a guest's room); Chapman v. United States, 365 U.S. 610, 615-18
(1961) (holding that a landlord may not consent to a search of the tenant's residence). Here, the
prosecutor effectively conceded below that, given that Ms. Turner was living in Mr. Simons's
home with his permission (see Tr., p.67, Ls.8-9), Mr. Simons lacked actual authority to consent
to the police actions in this case; thus, the prosecutor proceeded only on an apparent authority
theory:
The State has the burden of proof that it's an exception to the warrant
requirement by a preponderance of the evidence. In this case, we actually have
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two consents to be analyzed. Once is the consent that came from Mr. Simons ...
the consent to search the whole house by Mr. Simons; second is to search the
bedroom or enter the bedroom at least by Ms. Turner.
Regarding the first one, the State, probably on the evidence that we have,
could concede that there wasn't an actual authority by Mr. Simons to give the
consent to search. I've reviewed several cases. [Cases listed.]
In those cases, they indicate that a landlord-if there is a landlord, and if
the landlord/tenant situation does arise here, which we don't believe that it does.
But assuming that it is there, a landlord cannot give consent to search a house, a
home, occupied by a tenant.
That being the case ... that doesn't mean or obviate the ability of the
search by officers who reasonably rely upon the apparent authority of the
homeowner....
Based upon that consent, the officers went in .... At that point I don't
believe they need probable cause and there's certainly no exigent circumstances
or anything like that, but they've got consent. So they enter the home.
(Tr., p.64, L.9 - p.66, L.14.) Since Mr. Simons had no actual authority to consent to anything,
the question is whether he had apparent authority to consent to a search of the toilet.
As Ms. Turner conceded in her opening brief, Mr. Simons had apparent authority to
consent to the officers' initial entry into the home. (See App. Br., pp.16, 29 n.21.) Indeed, the
limited, second-hand, days-old information the officers had at that time of the entry was that
Mr. Simons owned the home and, although a few people were allowed to be on the property,
Mr. Simons had not rented the home out. (See generally Ex. A.) Under those circumstances,
reasonable officers may have believed-as Deputies Wynn and Pulley did here-that
Mr. Simons had authority to consent to their entry into his home. See Rodriguez, 497 U.S. at
186. However, by the time the officers entered the home, observed the situation, spoke to the
occupants, and fmally searched the toilet, they had learned information which should have
dispelled any initial belief that Mr. Simons had authority to consent to a full search of the
premises. Among other things, they observed Ms. Turner dressed for lounging, if not bed; they
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heard all three occupants claim separately that Ms. Turner was living in the home; they knew
that Ms. Turner had a key to the front door that worked; and they heard all three occupants
maintain that Mr. Simons had been there just a few hours earlier, and had consented to
Ms. Turner being in the home. 4 Under these circumstances, the officer's mistaken belief that
Mr. Simons had authority to consent to a search of the premises was no longer reasonable.
Accordingly, the subsequent search of the toilet cannot now be justified under a "consent"
theory.

2.

Because The Unconstitutional Search Of The Bathroom Tainted Ms. Turner's
Subsequent "Consensual" Disclosure Of The Contraband In Bedroom (And Her
Statements About That Evidence), All The Evidence Should Have Been
Suppressed

a.

The Evidence Obtained In Ms. Turner's Bedroom Should Have Been
Suppressed As "Fruit Of The Poisonous Tree"

The State contends, in the alternative, that even if the officers' search of the toilet
violated Ms. Turner's Fourth Amendment rights, that illegal search was not the but-for cause of
the search of her bedroom and, therefore, the fruits of the search of the bedroom should not be
suppressed under the exclusionary rule. (Resp. Br., pp.29-33.) The State makes three arguments
in support of this proposition, none of which have merit.
First, the State argues that, because the officers never specifically confronted Ms. Turner
with the drugs and drug paraphernalia found in the toilet, directly accused her of possessing that
contraband, or ultimately arrested her for possessing it, the unlawful search that yielded the drugs
and paraphernalia in the toilet could not have been the but-for cause of the discovery of the drugs
and paraphernalia in her bedroom. (Resp. Br., pp.30-32, 33.) This is a bizarre argument for a
4

The officers quickly corroborated part of this assertion, as they confirmed that Mr. Simons had
been in St. Maries earlier that day. (Video 1 at 17:20 - 17:36.)
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number of reasons, not the least of which is that, at the time, Ms. Turner could not have known
whether, at some point, the State would try to hold her criminally liable for that particular
contraband. Furthermore, even if Ms. Turner truly believed that the State would never attempt to
attribute that contraband to her, that is irrelevant. She had just watched the police search the
kitchen and bathroom in the home in which she had been staying, and she heard the officers
repeatedly make comments suggesting the inevitability of them also searching her bedroom. 5
Viewing the entire encounter in context, this is the only objectively reasonable explanation for
why Ms. Turner came forward to disclose her own contraband to Deputy Pulley.
Second, the State complains that because Ms. Turner did not explicitly testify that the
illegal search of the toilet, coupled with Deputy Pulley's threats to search the rest of the house, is
what caused her to come forward and disclose the contraband in her bedroom, she failed to meet
her burden of showing but-for causation.

(Resp. Br., p.38.)

However, the State cites no

authority for the premise that the defendant must specifically testify that she behaved as she did
because of the original illegality. That is likely because there is no such bright-line requirement.
The question is whether the evidence seized was "come at by exploitation of that illegality or
instead by means sufficiently distinguishable to be purged of the primary taint." Wong Sun v.
United States, 371 U.S. 471, 488 (1963). Courts that have applied this standard have done so

5

As noted in Ms. Turner's opening brief, Deputy Pulley made two separate comments
suggesting that he had every intention of searching Ms. Turner's bedroom. Initially, he asked,
"Ms. Turner, you're not going to have any narcotics in there, are you? In that room? Yes or
no?" (Video 1 at 25:02 - 25:11.) By couching his question in the future tense ("you're not
going to have"), he conveyed that he would be searching her bedroom before the night was over.
Seconds later, he asked all three occupants, "Is there gonna be any other narcotics here in the
house besides what's in the toilet?" (Video 1 at 25:16 - 25:20.) Hearing only denials, he then
lectured the three of them on the importance of honesty, thereby suggesting he did not believe
their denials. (See Video 1 at 25:28 - 25:53.) By once again couching his question in the future
tense ("is there gonna be any"), he again implied a full search of the house was forthcoming,
especially given that he made it clear that he did not believe the occupants' denials.
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based on the totality of the relevant circumstances. See, e.g., United States v. Thomas, 955 F.2d
207, 211 (4th Cir. 1992) (holding that being confronted with illegally-obtained evidence
rendered subsequent consent to search invalid-seemingly without regard to any specific
testimony from the defendant-so as to find that the subsequently-discovered evidence was not
purged of the taint of the original illegal search); State v. Hudson, 147 Idaho 335, 338 (Ct. App.
2009) (holding, without citing testimony from the defendant, that the defendant's consent for
police to search his motel room was tainted by the officer's illegal entry into the room); State v.
Tietsort, 145 Idaho 112, 119 (Ct. App. 2007) (holding that, "[c]onfronting a suspect with
evidence found in an unlawful search may constitute an exploitation of the prior illegality that
taints the consent thereby induced," despite there apparently having been no explicit testimony
from the defendant that his consent was prompted by the officers' actions); State v. Kerley, 134
Idaho 870, 874-75 (Ct. App. 2000) (holding that defendant's consent to search his pockets was
tainted by a preceding unlawful frisk, even though there was no testimony from the defendant).
Third, the State argues that, even assuming Deputy Pulley's threat to illegally search the
rest of the house, just as he had the bathroom, coerced Ms. Turner disclose the contraband in her
bedroom, the unlawful search of the bathroom still would not constitute a but-for cause of
Ms. Turner's disclosure. (Resp. Br., pp.32-33.) This argument is nonsensical. The wrongful
search of the bathroom lent credibility to Deputy Pulley's implied threat to search the rest of the
house (since, if he did it once already, there was no reason to believe he would not do it again).
As such, the unlawful search of the bathroom became part and parcel of the threat to search
further. And, if that threat coerced Ms. Turner's consent, surely it was a but-for cause of that
consent.
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Because the unlawful search of the bathroom was a but-for cause of the contraband found
1s Ms. Turner's bedroom, and because the State has failed to argue any of the recognized
exceptions to the exclusionary rule, the district court erred in failing to suppress that contraband
as "fruit of the poisonous tree."

b.

The Evidence Obtained In Ms. Turner's Bedroom Was Not A Product Of
Voluntary Consent

As an alternative to her argument that the contraband found in her bedroom was required
to have been suppressed as tainted fruit of the unlawful bathroom search, Ms. Turner contends
that it was the product of her inoperative (i.e., involuntary) consent. (See App. Br., pp.36-39.)
Although a district court's finding of voluntary consent is typically entitled to tremendous
deference, that is not so if the district court utterly failed to consider the effect of a prior illegal
search on the voluntariness of the consent; in that situation, the case has to be remanded to the
district court to consider the prior illegality and its effect on the voluntariness of consent. (See
App. Br., pp.36-39.) This argument is based on State v. Tietsort, 145 Idaho 112 (Ct. App. 2007),
which held as much.
In response, the State largely reprises the same arguments it made with regard to the
application of the exclusionary rule-it argues that an illegal search of the bathroom could not
have had any impact on Ms. Turner's consent to search her bedroom. (Resp. Br., pp.35-38.) For
the same reasons those arguments are meritless as applied to the exclusionary rule analysis, so
too are they meritless as applied to the voluntariness of Ms. Turner's consent. Accordingly, no
further response is warranted, and Ms. Turner requests that this Court vacate the district court's
order for the reasons in pages 36 through 39 of her Appellant's Brief
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CONCLUSION
For the reasons detailed above, and in her Appellant's Brief, Ms. Turner respectfully
requests that this Court find that she has Fourth Amendment "standing." Further, she asks that
this Court vacate her judgment of conviction and reverse the district court's order denying her
suppression motion based on the fruit of the poisonous tree doctrine. Alternatively, she asks that
the Court vacate the order denying her suppression motion, and that it remand the case for a
proper analysis of the voluntariness of her consent.
DATED this 7th day of July, 2020.
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